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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Under the First Amendment, “[t]he method for protecting 
freedom of worship and freedom of conscience in religious matters is quite 
the reverse” of that used to protect general freedom of speech.1 Unlike with 
speech,2 the government generally does not participate in religious dialogue 
                                                           
ǂ  J.D. Candidate 2021 at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. The author would like to first 
thank Professor Raleigh Levine and Professor Mike Steenson for their guidance, support, 
and mentorship not only on this article but throughout her entire law school career. The 
author would also like to say a special thank you to her family, friends, and mentors for 
everything ever; as the great Elle Woods once said, “We did it!” 
1 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992). 
2 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986) (upholding a zoning 
ordinance prohibiting adult motion picture theaters from being within 1,000 feet of any 
residential zone, single or multiple family dwelling, church, park, or school); R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384–86 (1992) (holding a city ordinance prohibiting people from 
things like burning a cross or putting up a Nazi swastika was unconstitutional because by 
1
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or debate, as “the Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical to 
the freedom of all.”3 Where the Free Exercise Clause embraces freedom of 
conscience and worship parallel to the speech provisions of the First 
Amendment, the Establishment Clause specifically prohibits “state 
intervention in religious affairs.”4 Yet courts have long recognized that “there 
is room for play in the joints” between the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause.5  
 While the Supreme Court does not recognize the right to public 
education as a fundamental right,6 the plaintiffs in Espinoza v. Montana 
Department of Revenue asked the Court to recognize an analogous right: a 
fundamental right to funding private religious education.7 Framed as a 
violation of the petitioners’ free exercise rights, the petitioners in Espinoza 
alleged that the Montana Department of Revenue infringed their right by 
excluding private religious schools from a tax credit program,8 and the 
Supreme Court agreed.9 
                                                           
regulating some fighting words more strictly than others, the government shows hostility or 
favoritism towards the underlying message); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 
(1969) (finding that the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act violated the First Amendment 
because it punished mere advocacy for a type of action without distinguishing it from 
incitement to imminent lawless action). 
3 Lee, 505 U.S. at 591. 
4 Id. 
5 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 
397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). In Walz, a real estate owner sought an injunction to prevent the 
New York courts from granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for 
religious properties used solely for religious worship. Walz, 397 U.S. at 666. The owner 
argued that the grant of an exemption to church property indirectly required him to make a 
contribution to religious bodies, thus violating the Establishment Clause. Id. at 667. The 
Court importantly noted the room to “play in the joints” and required value judgments under 
the Religion Clauses to turn on “whether particular acts in question [were] intended to 
establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so.” Id. 
at 669. The Supreme Court determined that the tax exemption did not violate the First 
Amendment’s Religion Clauses. Id. at 680.  
6 San Antonio Index. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of course, 
is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do 
we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”). 
7 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 23–24, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246 
(2020) (No.18-1195), 2019 WL 6726413, at *22 (explaining the history and tradition of 
similar No-Aid clauses and asking the Court to end the national tradition of religious 
discrimination). 
8 Espinoza v. Montana Dep't of Rev., 435 P.3d 603, 607–08 (Mont. 2018), cert. granted, 139 
S. Ct. 2777 (2019), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (referencing MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6 
(West, Westlaw through 2019)) (“The legislature, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and 
public corporations shall not make any direct or indirect appropriation or payment from any 
public fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other property for any sectarian purpose or 
to aid any church, school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or 
scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination.”). 
9 Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2262–63 (2020). 
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  This paper proposes that while Montana’s scholarship tuition tax 
credit program10 advances religion and would lead to excessive government 
entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, the 
Court erred in its reasoning. The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment 
are not the proper precedential pathway. The Court’s past decisions 
regarding the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause are so narrow and 
limited in scope that Espinoza was best decided elsewhere. Montana’s 
scholarship program should be subject to rational basis review because there 
was no infringement of a fundamental right. Funds are not fundamental. 
 This paper begins by discussing the history of the freedom of 
religion, specifically the free exercise rights and anti-establishment provision 
of the First Amendment.11 Next, this paper will discuss Espinoza v. Montana 
Department of Revenue.12 Finally, this paper will argue that Espinoza should 
have been decided in favor of the Montana Department of Revenue 
because the fundamental right to free exercise of religion does not include 
a right to funding.13 
II. HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
 As the first portion of the First Amendment, the Establishment 
Clause and Free Exercise Clause share in subject literally and 
metaphorically.14 Justice Rutledge noted, “‘[r]eligion’ appears only once in 
the [First] Amendment. But the word governs two prohibitions and governs 
them alike.”15 However, as precedent demonstrates, while these two clauses 
are often analyzed together, the interpretation of them, together and apart, 
varies. This section begins by discussing the Framers’ approaches to 
                                                           
10 Constitutional analysis requires examination of the relationship form “for the light that it 
casts on the substance.” Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
756, 790 (1973) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)). Here the relationship 
between the tax credit program and the substance is clear. The program is a tuition credit. 
First, individuals receive tax credits for donating to nonprofit student scholarship 
organizations. Brief of Respondents at 3, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246 
(2020) (No.18-1195) 2019 WL 5887033, at *3. Next, these organizations use the donations 
to fund scholarships for qualified education providers. Id. at 4. The substance is made clear 
by the fact that the petitioners relied on the tax credit to create financial aid to allow them to 
send their children to these religious private schools. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 
7, at 7.   
11 See infra Part II. 
12 See infra Part III. 
13 See infra Part IV. 
14 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The structure of the First Amendment is that “of religion” 
describes both the first clause, which is that Congress may not make laws respecting 
establishment of religion, and the second clause. Separated by a comma and not a semi-
colon, the Free Exercise Clause builds off of the Establishment Clause in sentence structure 
literally.  
15 Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  
3
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religion, which serves as a starting point for understanding modern 
precedent. Next, this section looks at key cases implicating both the 
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause. 
A. Framers’ Approach to Free Exercise and the Establishment Clause 
 In analyzing the “play in the joints” between the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause, it makes sense to begin by assessing 
the schools of thought that influenced the drafters of the First Amendment.16 
There were three dominant perspectives regarding the relationship between 
the government and religion among the Framers: the Evangelical view, the 
Jeffersonian view, and the Madisonian view.17  
 The Evangelical view, championed by Roger Williams, believed 
that “worldly corruptions . . . might consume the churches if sturdy fences 
against the wilderness were not maintained.”18 Those in this school of 
thought were concerned “that government involvement with religion would 
corrupt and undermine religion.”19 
  In contrast to the Evangelical view, Jefferson believed religion 
“should be walled off from the state in order to safeguard secular interests . 
. . against ecclesiastical depredations and incursions.”20 The Jeffersonian 
view stands for the “fear that religion would corrupt and undermine the 
government.”21 
  Madison landed somewhere between Williams and Jefferson.22 
The Madisonian view believed that religious and secular interests “would be 
advanced best by diffusing and decentralizing power so as to assure 
competition among sects” and avoid dominance.23 Madison opposed “every 
form and degree of official relation between religion and civil authority” as 
“religion was a wholly private matter beyond the scope of civil power either 
to restrain or to support.”24 
 Though differing in their reasoning, each view expresses a desire 
to prevent entanglement of religion with government. The Framers sought 
                                                           
16 Larry R. Thaxton, Silence Begets Religion: Bown v. Gwinnett County School District and 
the Unconstitutionality of Moments of Silence in Public Schools, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1399, 
1400 (1996). 
17 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1723 (5th ed. 
2015). 
18 Id. (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158-1159 (2d ed. 
1988)). 
19 Id. (emphasis added). 
20 Id. (quoting TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1159). 
21 Id. 
22 See id. at 1723–24. 
23 Id. (quoting TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1159). 
24 Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 39–40 (1947) (Rutlegde, J., 
dissenting). 
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to separate the concerns of government from the concerns of individual 
religious communities. The Framers enumerated this desire in the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment. The clauses act as a double-edged sword, 
prohibiting establishment of religion, but protecting the free exercise 
thereof.25 
B. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist26 
 In Nyquist, the Supreme Court struck down two provisions of a 
New York statute related to aid for nonpublic schools as it violated the 
Establishment Clause.27 
 The New York statute established financial aid programs for 
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools.28 The first section at issue 
provided direct monetary grants from the state to qualifying nonpublic 
schools for the maintenance and repair of school facilities.29 Qualifying 
schools were nonpublic, nonprofit schools designated as serving a high 
concentration of low-income families.30 Maintenance and repair included 
provision of heat, light, water, ventilation, sanitary facilities, cleaning 
services, snow removal, and “such other items as the commissioner may 
deem necessary to ensure the health, welfare and safety of enrolled pupils.”31 
 The second issue was a two-part program created by the New 
York statute: a tuition grant program and a tax benefit program.32 First, the 
plan provided tuition reimbursement to parents of children attending 
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools if they also met the income 
requirement.33 Second, the plan provided tax relief to parents of children 
attending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools who failed to qualify 
for tuition reimbursement.34 The statute allowed parents to subtract a 
designated amount from their adjusted gross incomes per each dependent 
the parent paid at least $50 for in nonpublic school tuition.35 
                                                           
25 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
26 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
27 See id. (finding the provisions violated the Establishment Clause because the statute’s 
primary effect was to advance religion).  
28 Id. at 761–62. 
29 Id. at 762.  
30 Id. at 762–63. 
31 Id. at 763. 
32 Id. at 764. 
33 Id. To qualify for a tuition reimbursement the parent needed to have a taxable income 
under $5,000. Id.  
34Id. at 765. 
35 Id. The program adjusted the amount allowed based on income. Id. For example, if a 
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income was less than $9,000 that taxpayer could subtract $1,000 for 
5
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 New York residents sought to enjoin the state from approving or 
paying any funds, or according tax benefits under the statute, arguing that 
the three provisions violated the Establishment Clause.36  
 The district court found the maintenance and repair grants and 
tuition reimbursement grants violated the Establishment Clause, but that the 
tax credit did not violate the Establishment Clause.37 
 As to the maintenance and repair portion, the district court 
accepted the intent as secular but found that the provision had the effect of 
advancing religion.38 The provision involved continuing financial and 
political relationships and dependencies between the schools and the state.39 
The court hypothesized that if it allowed a public subsidy for janitorial 
services for nonpublic schools, the next step may be to supply desks, 
blackboards, and even a portion of the building because those items are not 
“religious in character.”40 
 The court struck down the tuition reimbursement, noting that a 
“[s]tate-supported church school is simply not a part of our way of life, and 
the payment of tuition for its pupils makes the church school a [s]tate-
supported school.”41 The court held that “a subsidy to those who practice a 
particular religion to enable them to observe its tenets is not compatible with 
either clause of the First Amendment.”42 The state argued that its program 
was constitutional because it reimbursed poor parents and allowed them to 
exercise their constitutional right of free exercise.43 However, the court 
noted that if it accepted this argument that “[i]f conditions worsen, it would 
be proper, under this argument, to pay the salaries of the secular teachers.”44 
Thus court rejected the state’s argument, as it feared that expanding the 
meaning of the Establishment Clause in this case may lead to a point where 
the state supports and controls parochial schools.45 
                                                           
as many as three dependents. Id. As adjusted gross income rises, the amount deductible 
decreases. Id. 
36 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 768–69. 
37 Id.  
38 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972). 
39 Id. (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971)). 
40 Id. at 666. 
41 Id. at 669. 
42 Id. The court continued, hypothesizing that if a state may give a subsidy for religious 
education, that it may then be able to give a subsidy to purchase sacramental wine or a 
crucifix, or for a trip to a religious event, or even for a Muslim to take a pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 670. 
45 Id. (noting that “Once we embark upon such a course, we fear that the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause will be diluted to the point where the State will support the parochial 
6
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 The court upheld the tax credit and distinguished it from the 
other provisions in the statute.46 First, the court found that the tax credit was 
not restricted to areas containing only Catholic religiously affiliated 
schools.47 The credit covered attendance at all nonprofit private schools in 
the state of New York.48 
 Next, the court noted that the tax credit did not involve a subsidy 
or monetary grant from the state treasury to the schools or the families.49 
Unlike the maintenance and repair provision and the reimbursement 
provision, the tax credit involved no receipt of money from the 
government.50 Instead, the tax credit allowed for a decrease in taxable 
income for filing and tax return purposes.51 The court found that precedent 
made a distinction between direct grants of public funds and tax exemptions, 
which are generally permitted.52 
 The court also noted that the provision recompensed citizens who 
bear the burden of maintaining public schools, but who, for religious or 
other reasons, send their children to nonpublic schools.53 The court noted 
that lightening the tax burden for those who contribute to public education 
but derive no benefit from it is a legitimate legislative purpose, comparing it 
to the school tax exemption for the childless or aged.54 Lastly, the court 
noted that the benefit to parochial schools was so remote that it did not 
involve impermissible financial aid to schools.55 Thus, there was limited 
administrative entanglement with the tax credit provision.56 
 The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that 
Establishment Clause precedent requires careful examination of laws to 
ascertain whether the law furthers “any of the evils against which that clause 
protects” like “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the 
[government] in religious activity.”57  
                                                           
schools with the inevitable control by the State built into an anomalous situation. That is a 
condition devoutly not to be wished.”). 
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 670–71. 
51 Id. at 659. 
52 Id. at 671. 
53 Id. at 670–71. 
54 Id. at 673. 
55 Id. at 671 (noting that “the income tax exemption (which is in effect a tax credit since the 
exemption is not intended to equal the parents’ outlay) is to individuals, not to churches or 
church schools, a step removed.”). 
56 Id. 
57 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973) 
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'm. of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).  
7
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 The Court accepted New York’s secular legislative purpose for all 
three provisions.58 The Court noted New York’s interests in “preserving a 
healthy and safe educational environment,” “promoting pluralism and 
diversity,” and its concern for its overburdened system were sufficient 
secular purposes under the Lemon test.59 
 Next, the Court weighed each provision against the final two 
prongs of the Lemon test: primary effect and entanglement.60 The Court 
found that the maintenance and repair provision failed the second prong 
because it effectively subsidized and advanced religion.61 The Court noted 
that the payments were not restricted to upkeep of facilities used for secular 
purposes, adding that it may be impossible to restrict funds in that manner.62 
The Court compared the maintenance and repair provision to a funds for 
construction of a facility, finding that if a state may not erect buildings where 
religious activities may take place, the state may not maintain or renovate 
them either.63 
 Justice Powell’s majority opinion found that the tuition 
reimbursement program also failed the primary effects portion of the 
Lemon test.64 The tuition reimbursement provision did not guarantee the 
separation between secular and religious educational functions.65 The Court 
held that the state sought to relieve the financial burdens of parents that send 
their children to private schools to “assure that they continue to have the 
option to send their children to religion-oriented schools.”66 Though aid to 
perpetuate pluralistic education and protect overburdened schools are 
                                                           
58 Id. at 773. 
59 Id. (discussing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)) (establishing a three-part 
test to determine whether the law in question passes muster under the Establishment Clause). 
The Court defined the three-part test, outlined in Lemon, as first, a secular legislative 
purpose, second, “a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and third, that 
the statute “must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.” Id.  
60 Id. at 774.  
61 Id. at 779–80. 
62 Id. at 774. 
63 Id. at 776–77. The Court found Tilton v. Richardson to be instructive and persuasive on 
this issue. Id. at 775. In Tilton, the Court upheld federal grants to be used for construction 
of facilities for “clearly secular purposes by public and nonpublic institutions.” Id. (reviewing 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)). In Tilton, the government was entitled, under 
the clause of a federal statute, to recover portions of its grants in the event the facility was 
used to advance religion. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 682. The provision was initially set to expire 
at the end of a twenty-year period, but the Court struck that portion down as it would open 
the facility to sectarian use after that period. See id. at 683. The Court drew the conclusion 
that if funds may not be granted to build a facility that may be used for sectarian purposes in 
twenty years, they may not be distributed to maintain and repair facilities without limiting 
their use to secular purposes. See id. 
64 Nyquist at 780. 
65 Id. at 783. 
66 Id.  
8
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compelling, the Court held that “the effect of the aid [was] unmistakably to 
provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.”67 
 The Court held the tax credit provision had the impermissible 
effect of advancing the sectarian activities of religious schools.68 The tax 
deduction flowed primarily to the parents of children attending sectarian 
nonpublic schools.69 The Court also noted that there was little difference in 
determining effect between the tax benefit and the tuition grant.70 Under 
both the reimbursement program and tax benefit program, parents received 
the same form of encouragement and reward for sending their children to 
nonpublic schools.71 The only difference was that one received actual 
payment from the state while the other reduced the sum they would 
otherwise be obliged to pay the state.72 Despite the difference in form, the 
Court held both provisions violated the effects test for the same underlying 
reasons.73 
C. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris74 
 In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court held that 
Ohio’s Pilot Scholarship Program did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.75 Ohio established its Pilot Project Scholarship Program to provide 
families in the Cleveland City School District with educational choices.76 
The Cleveland City School District failed to meet any state standards for 
minimal acceptable performance and more than two-thirds of the high 
school students dropped out or failed before graduation.77 
 Ohio’s scholarship program provided two kinds of assistance. 
The first part of the program provided tuition aid for students that attended 
a public or private school of their family’s choosing for kindergarten through 
third grade, the program subsequently expanded to include children up to 
the eighth grade.78 The program allowed any private school, whether 
religious or not, to participate in the program and accept students if it was 
located in the boundaries of the district and met statewide educational 
standards.79 The private schools were required to agree not to discriminate 
                                                           
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 794. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 790–91. 
71 Id. at 791. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
75 Id. at 662. 
76 Id. at 644. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
9
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based on race, religion, or ethnicity.80 Additionally, private schools had to 
agree not to advocate or foster unlawful behavior and refrain from teaching 
hatred based on race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion.81 Any public school 
located in a school district adjacent to the covered district was also eligible 
to participate in the program.82 
 Ohio distributed aid to parents according to financial need, giving 
priority to families below 200% of the poverty line.83 These parents were 
“eligible to receive 90 percent of private school tuition up to $2,250.”84 Also, 
private schools could not charge these parents a copay greater than $250.85  
 All other parents were eligible to receive 75% of tuition up to 
$1,875.86 However, these families only received tuition aid if the number of 
low-income children participating was less than the number of available 
scholarships.87 There was no copay cap for these parents.88  
 Second, the program provided tutorial aid for students who 
remained enrolled in public schools.89 Through this part of the program, 
parents arranged for registered tutors to assist their children and then 
submitted bills to Ohio for payment.90 
 The program began operating during the 1996 to 1997 school 
year.91 During the 1999 to 2000 school year, fifty-six private schools 
participated and forty-six of them were religiously affiliated.92 Of the students 
participating in the program, 96% enrolled in religiously affiliated schools.93  
 A group of Ohio taxpayers challenged the program in state court 
in 1996.94 The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the federal claims and held 
that the enactment of the program violated procedural requirements of 
Ohio’s Constitution.95 Ohio’s legislature cured the defects found, so only 
the basic provisions of the program remained intact.96 In 1999, the same 
                                                           
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 Id.  







90 Id.  
91 Id. at 647. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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group of Ohio taxpayers filed an action in United States district court to 
enjoin the reenacted program, arguing it violated the Establishment Clause.97 
 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Ohio 
taxpayers.98 The court began its analysis by looking at the history of the 
Establishment Clause, noting that the Supreme Court generally holds that 
government may not provide scholarship assistance to students supporting 
religious instruction or indoctrination.99 The district court added that 
scholarships are approved where the aid is part of a “program made 
generally available without regard to the public-nonpublic or sectarian-
nonsectarian nature of the schools.”100 In those cases, there is no religious 
indoctrination attributable to the government; it is private choice of the aid 
recipient.101 
 In analyzing the parties’ claims, the district court applied the 
Lemon test, as reaffirmed by the Court in Agostini v. Felton.102 The district 
court noted that Agostini collapsed the Lemon test into two prongs and 
divided the second prong into three sub-parts.103 Thus, a “challenged 
governmental aid passes constitutional muster if it does not: ‘result in 
governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; 
or create an excessive entanglement.’”104 
  The district court concluded that while Agostini no longer 
applied an absolute ban on direct aid supporting religious institutions under 
the Establishment Clause, the circumstances where aid is permissible still 
would not include Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, which the court concluded was factually indistinguishable from the 
case at hand.105  
 The district court analyzed Ohio’s program under the Agostini 
standard, and found that the program “[ran] afoul of both the indoctrination 
prong and the financial incentives prong of the effects test.”106 Ohio’s 
program was not neutrally available without regard to religious-nonreligious, 
public-nonpublic nature of schools benefitted.107 First, there were very few 
                                                           
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 843 (N.D. Ohio 1999). 
100 Id. at 844. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)). 
105 Id. at 859. The Ohio taxpayers argued that Ohio’s Pilot Program was unconstitutional 
under Nyquist because it was factually indistinguishable from the program in Nyquist. Id. at 
844. They argued that the program had the effect of advancing religion, thus failing the 
second prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 845. The government contended that Ohio’s program 
was dissimilar and should be assessed in light of more recent Supreme Court cases. Id.  
106 Id. at 859. 
107 Id. 
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nonreligious options available to eligible students, so the court concluded 
that it was not possible to say the decision to attend a religious school was 
made as a result of the “genuinely independent choice of aid recipients.”108 
Also, there were no limitations on how schools could use the funds, nor 
safeguards to ensure secular instruction.109 Next, the court found that Ohio’s 
program incentivized students to attend religious schools because the 
program required that students attend a participating school and the 
overwhelming majority of those schools were religiously affiliated.110 
 On appeal, a panel for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court’s decision.111 In its analysis, the court noted that 
the Lemon test is regularly used in the context of schools and education and 
that cases like Agostini demonstrate the test’s flexibility.112  
 The Sixth Circuit then compared the program in Ohio to the 
program in Nyquist, finding it to be the most persuasive and “on point with 
the matter at hand.”113 The court noted that, factually, Ohio’s program 
paralleled the tuition reimbursement program in Nyquist.114 Both programs 
provided for parents to receive government funds, either directly as 
payment for tuition or as reimbursement.115 Additionally, both programs did 
not include provisions guaranteeing that the funds would be used exclusively 
for neutral and nonideological purposes.116 Lastly, neither program 
restricted religious schools’ use of tuition, finding that “the funds may be 
used for religious instruction or materials as easily as for erasers and 
playground equipment.”117 
 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the “alleged choice afforded [to] 
both public and private school participants . . . [was] illusory.”118 No public 
schools outside of Cleveland registered in the school voucher program, and 
there were no spaces available for children who wished to attend suburban 
public schools under the program.119 Ultimately, the appellate court held 
that the Establishment Clause is violated when “the government has 
established a program which does not permit private citizens to direct 
                                                           
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 860. 
111 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 948 (6th Cir. 2000). 
112 Id. at 952–53. The court noted that Agostini introduced components that are aspects of 
the Lemon test, but that precedent is not limited only to those components. Id. at 953. The 
court added that other components previously utilized by the Supreme Court could be 
relevant in assessing a claim under the Lemon test. Id. 
113 Id. at 953. 
114 Id. at 958. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 959. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. 
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government aid freely as is their private choice, but which restricts their 
choice to a panoply of religious institutions and spaces with only a few 
alternative possibilities.”120 
 The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision.121 The Court noted that the first prong of the Lemon test was 
satisfied because the statute was “enacted for the valid secular purpose of 
providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing 
public school system.”122  
 Thus, the primary question was whether the Ohio program had 
the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.123 After assessing precedent, the 
Court concluded that “where a government aid program is neutral with 
respect to religion, and provides assistance to a broad class of citizens who . 
. . direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own 
genuine and independent private choice,” the program is not subject to 
challenge under the Establishment Clause.124 The Court upheld Ohio’s 
program, holding that it was entirely neutral with respect to religion because 
it provided “benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only 
by financial need and residence in a particular school district.”125 
The Supreme Court strayed from the lower court’s analysis and declined to 
look at Nyquist as determinative.126 The Court noted that the two programs 
are dissimilar, as the program in Nyquist gave benefits exclusively to private 
schools and parents of private school students.127 Also, in Nyquist, the Court 
expressly reserved judgment with respect to cases involving public assistance 
“made available generally and without regard to sectarian-nonsectarian, or 
public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited.”128  
 The Supreme Court found Ohio’s program to be one of “true 
private choice.”129 The Court noted that the program permitted participation 
of all schools within the Cleveland City School district, religious or 
nonreligious.130 The program similarly determined eligibility on neutral 
terms without reference to religion, using income as the primary factor in 
determining eligibility.131 
                                                           
120 Id. at 960. 
121 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
122 Id. at 649. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 652. 
125 Id. at 662. 
126 Id. at 661. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782–
83 (1973)). 
129 Id. at 653. 
130 Id. at 652. 
131 Id. at 653. 
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 Next, the Supreme Court held that Ohio’s program did not 
provide financial incentives to skew the program towards religious schools.132 
In fact, the Court determined that Ohio’s program disincentivized religious 
schools.133 Private schools received only half of the assistance given to 
community schools and one-third of the assistance given to magnet 
schools.134 Also, parents that chose to send their children to private schools 
paid a portion of the school’s tuition while families at public or magnet 
schools paid no tuition.135 
 The Court rejected the argument that Ohio’s program created the 
public perception that Ohio endorsed religious practices or beliefs.136 The 
Court concluded that any objective observer familiar with the history and 
context of Ohio’s program would reasonably view the program as “one 
aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor children in failed schools, not 
as an endorsement of religious schooling in general.”137 
 Though forty-six of the fifty-six participating private schools were 
religious, the Court did not find an Establishment Clause violation.138 The 
Court believed the question should be whether Ohio coerced parents into 
sending their children to religious schools, not whether it had the effect of 
advancing religion.139 
D. Locke v. Davey140 
 In Locke v. Davey, the Rehnquist Court held that the state of 
Washington’s Promise Scholarship Program was constitutional despite 
including a provision that a scholarship recipient could not pursue a degree 
in devotional theology.141  
 Washington’s Promise Scholarship Program assisted high-
achieving students that may not otherwise have the financial ability to attend 
                                                           
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 654.  
134 Id. In the dissent, Justice Souter argued that the program was not neutral because 
participating students could not spend their scholarship vouchers at public schools. Id. at 
690 n.3. The majority opinion rejected this reasoning because students enrolled at public 
schools received tutoring aid, which was almost twice as much funding as the students who 
chose to attend private schools. Id. at 654. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 655. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 655–56. In his dissent, Justice Souter argued that because more private religious 
schools participated, the program “discouraged participation of private nonreligious 
schools.” Id. at 656. However, the majority opinion rejected this argument as well because 
the amount of religiously affiliated schools “did not arise as a result of the program,” but 
rather, is a phenomenon common to many cities. Id. at 657. 
140 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
141 Id. at 715. 
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college.142 Eligible students needed to meet a number of requirements. First, 
the student needed to graduate from a Washington high school in the top 
15% of their class or obtain at least a set minimum on college admissions 
tests.143 Next, the student’s family income could not be more than 135% of 
Washington’s median income.144 Lastly, and at issue in this case, was the 
requirement that the student enroll at least half time at an eligible in-state 
postsecondary institution and not pursue a degree in devotional theology 
while receiving the scholarship.145 Though not defined by the statute, the 
parties agreed that it codified Washington’s constitutional prohibition on 
providing funding for students pursuing degrees “devotional in nature or 
designed to induce religion faith.”146  
 Davey sued various Washington officials seeking to enjoin 
Washington from refusing to award the scholarship solely because a student 
pursues a devotional theology degree.147 Davey argued Washington violated 
the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses by denying him 
the scholarship money based on his decision to pursue a devotional 
theology degree.148  
 However, the district court rejected Davey’s constitutional claims, 
granting summary judgment in favor of the State.149 As to Davey’s 
Establishment Clause challenge, the court rejected his claim that the 
Establishment Clause required Washington to fund religious education.150 
Looking to Maine’s Supreme Court, the district court stated that the 
Establishment Clause does not require government assistance to make the 
practice of religion more available or easier.151 
                                                           
142 Id. at 715–16. 
143 Id. at 716. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. (citing WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11).  
147 Id. at 718. 
148 Id. 
149 Id.  
150 Order Denying Plaintiff's and Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Davey v. Locke, No. C00-61R, 2000 WL 35505408 at *5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2000). 
151 Id. (citing Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep’t., 728 A.2d 127, 136 (Maine 1999)). The court 
looked to Maine’s decision in Bagley to address an argument made regarding the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause in Agostini. Id. Maine’s Supreme Court 
noted that the Establishment Clause does not have a role in requiring government assistance 
to make practice of religion more available or easier. Id. The district court also addressed 
Davey’s Free Exercise Clause argument. Id. Davey asked the court to apply the holdings of 
Sherbert v. Verner and its progeny to questions of school funding. Id. The court declined to 
apply the case holdings outside of unemployment compensation. Id. Ultimately, the court 
held there was no Free Exercise Clause violation because there is no right to have 
Washington fund religious instruction. Id.  
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 On appeal, a panel for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
declared the scholarship program unconstitutional.152 The Ninth Circuit 
approached precedent from a different direction, beginning with Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah.153 The court stated that non-neutral 
and not generally applicable laws burdening religious practice must advance 
compelling interests and “be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those 
interests.”154 In addressing Washington’s scholarship program, the court 
found that the program lacked neutrality because free exercise encompasses 
the right to be a minister and Washington’s program, on its face, disqualifies 
clergy.155 The Ninth Circuit’s panel also addressed the free speech 
arguments made by Davey, finding that the program was viewpoint based 
because it discriminates against religious ideas.156  
 After establishing that Washington’s scholarship program was 
facially discriminatory, the court addressed the compelling interest 
requirement. The court did not recognize Washington’s interest in 
achieving greater separation of church and state because that interest is 
already ensured under the federal Establishment Clause and the degree of 
separation is limited by the Free Exercise Clause.157 
 The Supreme Court approached its analysis of the case 
differently. While the Ninth Circuit analyzed the case within the parameters 
of the Free Exercise Clause alone, the Supreme Court made its decision 
within the “play in the joints” between the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause.158 Rejecting the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit’s panel, 
the Supreme Court distinguished the circumstances of Locke from those of 
Lukumi because Washington’s scholarship program did not impose 
criminal or civil sanctions on any type of religious service or right; 159 it did 
not deny ministers the ability to participate in the political affairs of the 
community; and it did not require students to choose between religious 
beliefs and receipt of a government benefit.160  
                                                           
152 Locke, 540 U.S. at 718.  
153 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
 
154 Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 756. 
157 Id. at 759. 
158 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004). 
159 Id. at 720. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals looked to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah for guidance in determining the level of scrutiny 
necessary. Davey, 299 F.3d at 753 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520 (1993)). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Lukumi was implicated 
because the Washington state scholarship policy referred to religion on its face and thus was 
not neutral or generally applicable. Id. 
160 Locke, 540 U.S. at 720–21. 
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 Next, the Rehnquist majority addressed Justice Scalia’s dissent. 
Justice Scalia argued that by providing generally available benefits as part of 
a baseline, which includes training for secular professions, the State must 
also fund training for religious professions.161 The majority rejected this 
argument, noting that religious education for ministry shares no counterpart 
with respect to other callings or professions, as majoring in devotional 
theology is not only an academic pursuit, but also a religious calling.162  
 In addressing the Washington Constitution’s anti-establishment 
interests, the Court first looked to tradition and history.163 The Court 
discussed a history of popular uprisings against use of taxpayer funds to 
support churches or church leaders.164 The Court also discussed the 
existence of anti-establishment clauses in a number of other state 
constitutions, citing Georgia, Delaware, Kentucky, Vermont, Tennessee, 
and Ohio as examples.165 In its analysis, the Court pointed to the fact that 
Washington’s scholarship program included religion in its benefits by 
allowing students to attend religious schools and to take devotional theology 
classes.166 
 Thus, American history and Washington’s interests adequately 
supported the Court’s conclusion that anti-establishment clause and 
scholarship program did not suggest religious animus.167 The Court held that 
the program was a permissible exercise of the play in the joints; “[i]f any 
room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here.”168 
E. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer169 
 In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, the Roberts 
Court found that the Missouri Department of Natural Resources’ 
playground resurfacing program was unconstitutional for categorically 
disqualifying churches and other religious organizations from receiving 
grants.170  
 The Missouri Department of Natural Resources offered state 
grants to help schools, daycare centers, and nonprofit entities purchase 
                                                           
161 Id. at 721. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 722–23. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 723. Each cited constitution “prohibited any tax dollars from supporting the clergy.” 
Id.  
166 Id. at 724–25. 
167 Id. at 725.  
168 See id. 
169 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). 
170 Id. at 2017, 2025. 
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rubber playground surfaces.171 Due to limited funding, grants were awarded 
based on several criteria, like “poverty level of the population in the 
surrounding area, and the applicant’s plan to promote recycling.”172 The 
program expressly denied grants to applicants owned or controlled by 
churches, religious sects, or other religious entities173 as compelled by 
Missouri’s Constitution, which provides that money cannot be “taken from 
the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or 
denomination of religion . . . .”174 
 Trinity Lutheran operated a preschool and daycare center on its 
property that admitted students of any religion.175 Trinity Lutheran’s daycare 
and preschool center ranked fifth among forty-four applicants for a grant 
the year it applied for playground funding but was deemed “categorically 
ineligible” because it was operated by a church.176 
 Trinity Lutheran sued alleging that the Missouri Department of 
Natural Resources violated its free exercise rights by failing to approve its 
grant application.177 Trinity Lutheran sought declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief prohibiting the Missouri Department of Natural Resources 
from discrimination against Trinity Lutheran in grant applications.178 
 The district court dismissed Trinity Lutheran’s complaint,179 
beginning its analysis by addressing Article 1, section 7 of the Missouri 
Constitution.180 The district court concluded that section 7 “clearly 
prohibit[ed] public money from, directly or indirectly, going to aid a church, 
sect, or denomination of religions” and that the denial of Trinity Lutheran’s 
application for a grant could not be considered discrimination.181 
 Next, the court addressed Trinity Lutheran’s free exercise 
claim.182 Trinity Lutheran argued that the decision to deny its application 
“targeted Trinity [Lutheran] for disparate treatment on the basis of 
religion.”183 The court then looked to Locke.184 Trinity Lutheran argued that 
                                                           
171 Id. at 2017. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 MO. CONST. art. 1, § 7. 
175 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017. 
176 Id. at 2018. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 (W.D. 
Mo. 2013). 
180 Id. at 1141. 
181 Id. at 1145. 
182 Id. at 1146.  
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 1147. Trinity Lutheran cited to a number of cases to support its free exercise claim, 
however, the district court noted that each case involved an ordinance or regulation that 
directly prohibited or restricted the exercise of a religious practice. Id. at 1146. 
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it was distinguishable from Locke because that program prohibited funding 
of religious training of clergy and there is “a longstanding aversion to using 
tax dollars to fund the ministry,” which clearly invokes the state’s anti-
establishment interests.185  
 The district court rejected Trinity Lutheran’s reasoning, finding 
that the same anti-establishment concerns were raised because “Trinity 
[Lutheran] ultimately [sought] the direct payment of government funds to a 
religious institution.”186 The court first noted that programs of “true private 
choice,” where aid reaches religious schools due to “genuine and 
independent choices of private individuals,” are permissible.187 Next, the 
court added that states may not grant aid to religious schools where the aid 
is, in essence, “a direct subsidy to the religious school.”188  
 The court distinguished Trinity Lutheran’s situation from 
precedent because Trinity Lutheran did not claim that its playground was 
used “exclusively for secular purposes.”189 The district court also added that 
using taxpayer funds for Trinity Lutheran’s playground, “no matter how 
innocuous, raises Establishment Clause concerns.”190 
 A panel for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal.191 The court began by discussing Trinity Lutheran’s 
federal constitutional claims.192 The court noted that Trinity Lutheran 
sought the “unprecedented ruling—that a state constitution violates the First 
Amendment and Equal Protection Clause if it bars the grant of public funds 
to a church.”193 As to the federal claims, the court affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal for failure to state a claim because Missouri’s Constitutional 
provision did not conflict with the First Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.194  
 Next, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed Trinity 
Lutheran’s Missouri constitutional claim that the Department of Natural 
Resources denial of their grant “violated the second clause of Article I, § 7, 
                                                           
185 Id. at 1148.  
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 1149 (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002)). 
188 Id. (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 
(1986)). 
189 Id. at 1150. 
190 Id. (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 
(1973)). 
191 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 781 (8th Cir. 2015). 
192 Id. at 783. The court noted that Trinity Lutheran alleged that the Department of Natural 
Resources violated the Free Exercise Clause by targeting religion for disparate treatment; 
violated the Establishment Clause because the denial was hostile to religion; and violated 
Equal Protection by discriminating against religious day care organizations and centers. Id. 
193 Id.  
194 Id. at 784–85. 
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which forbids” discrimination against the church.195 The court affirmed the 
dismissal of the claim because the pleadings demonstrated that the grant 
from the Department of Natural Resources would aid Trinity Lutheran and 
its ministry as defined by Missouri law.196 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court took a different approach and 
began its analysis with the Free Exercise Clause and recent precedent.197 The 
Court noted that denial of a generally available benefit solely on account of 
religious identity imposes a penalty that must be justified by a state interest 
of the highest order.198 
 Next, the Court addressed Missouri’s policy, finding that “[it] 
expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying 
them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character.”199  
 The Court analogized Trinity Lutheran’s case to McDaniel v. 
Paty, where the Court struck down a statute that disqualified ministers from 
serving as delegates to Tennessee’s constitutional convention.200 The Court 
noted that like McDaniel, Missouri’s program gave Trinity Lutheran a 
choice: “participate in an otherwise available benefit program or remain a 
religious institution.”201 Framed this way, the Court added that the condition 
of the benefit in this way “punished the free exercise of religion.”202 
 The Missouri Department of Natural Resources argued that it 
only declined funding and did not prohibit Trinity Lutheran from engaging 
in religious conduct or otherwise exercising their religious rights.203 
However, the Court rejected that argument because Missouri’s program 
indirectly coerced and penalized the free exercise of religion.204 
 The Court distinguished the facts of Trinity Lutheran from 
Locke, because unlike Locke, Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant because 
it is a church.205 In Locke, Davey was denied a scholarship not because of 
who he was, but because of what he wanted to do. 
 As to the justifications offered by Missouri’s Department of 
Natural Resources to support the program, the Court noted that a “policy 
                                                           
195 Id. at 786. 
196 Id. at 787. The Eighth Circuit distinguished the facts of Trinity Lutheran from Americans 
United v. Rogers. Id. (citing Americans v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 718 (Mo. 1976). The 
court noted that unlike in Americans United, the program at issue in Trinity Lutheran’s case 
was not designed and implemented for the benefit of the students, but rather was the benefit 
of the institutions. Id. at 787–88.  
197 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017). 
198 Id. (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)). 
199 Id. at 2021. 
200 Id. at 2020 (citing McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 627). 
201 Id. at 2021–22. 
202 Id. at 2022. 
203 Id.  
204 Id. (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988)).  
205 Id. at 2023–24. 
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preference for skating as far as possible from religious establishment 
concerns” could not qualify as a compelling interest.206 
III. MONTANA’S NO-AID CLAUSE AND THE ESPINOZA CASE 
 On January 22, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments 
for Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue.207 The issue was whether 
a state may subsidize private secular education and not private religious 
education.208 Montana argued that the program’s structure protected against 
an Establishment Clause violation. The parents argued that the structure of 
the program violated their Free Exercise Clause rights,209 and the Court may 
find that Espinoza fits somewhere within the precedent discussed above. 
This next section discusses the decisions by the Montana state court and 
Montana Supreme Court.  
A. History and Background  
 Montana’s Legislature enacted a tax credit program in 2015 
entitled, “Tax Credit for Qualified Education Contributions.”210 The 
program gave taxpayers a tax credit for either providing supplemental 
funding to public schools or donating to the program.211 By donating to the 
program, a taxpayer would receive a dollar-for-dollar tax credit up to $150 
for donating to a student scholarship organization in Montana that met three 
additional criteria.212 The organization must be federal income tax-exempt; 
allocate no less than ninety percent of its revenue to scholarships for 
students to attend any qualified education provider; and provide educational 
scholarships to students without limiting access to a single school.213  
 Initially, the definition of qualified education providers included 
religious schools.214 However, this was identified as a “constitutional 
deficiency” because of Article X, section 6 of Montana’s Constitution, its 
No-Aid Clause.215 Under Article X, section 6, aid from the legislature, 
counties, cities, towns, school districts, and public corporations is prohibited 
                                                           
206 Id. at 2024. 
207 Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/espinoza-v-montana-department-of-revenue/ 
[https://perma.cc/C9B6-GWN6]. 
208 Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2251 (2020).  
209 Id. at 2251–52. 
210 Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 435 P.3d 603, 606 (Mont. 2018) (citing MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 15-30-3101–3114 (West 2015)). 
211 Id. 
212 Id.  
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id.  
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to sectarian schools.216 Thus, in implementing the tax credit program, the 
Montana Department of Revenue adopted Rule 1,217 which excluded from 
the tax credit program any qualified education provider “controlled in whole 
or in part by any church, religious sect, or denomination.”218 
 A group of parents whose children attended private religious 
school in Montana challenged Rule 1 in district court, arguing that excluding 
private religious schools from the definition of qualified education providers 
violated their free exercise rights under Montana’s Constitution and the U.S. 
Constitution.219 The Montana Department of Revenue argued that the tax 
credit program in its entirety was unconstitutional and, additionally, that the 
rule properly restricted the program from providing aid to sectarian 
schools.220 
 The district court focused its analysis on the tax credits.221 The 
court concluded that the credits did not involve the expenditure of money 
from the treasury, so including private religious schools would not violate 
Article X, section 6 of Montana’s Constitution.222 The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined the Montana 
Department of Revenue from applying or enforcing Rule 1.223  
B. Montana Supreme Court’s Decision 
 The Montana Supreme Court held that the tax credit program 
violated the Montana Constitution by providing aid to sectarian schools, and 
that the tax credit program, in its entirety, was unconstitutional.224 
 The Montana Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the tax 
credit program violated Article X, section 6 of Montana’s Constitution.225 
The court considered Article X, section 6 of Montana’s Constitution as 
existing within an even narrower “play in the joints” between the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses because it drew a more stringent line 
than what is required by the U.S. Constitution.226 
 First, Montana’s Supreme Court analyzed the constitutional 
provision at issue.227 The court concluded that the plain language and the 
                                                           
216 MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6. 
217 MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3102 (West 2015).  
218 Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 607 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3102 (West 2015)). 
219 Id. at 608. 
220 Id. 
221 Id.  
222 Id.  
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 615. 
225 Id. at 609. 
226 Id. at 608–09. 
227 Id. at 609–11. 
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Constitutional Convention Transcripts demonstrated that the clear 
objective of Article X, section 6 was to “firmly prohibit aid to sectarian 
schools.”228 
 Next, the court addressed the argument that the tax credit 
program was unconstitutional.229 The Montana Department of Revenue 
argued that the program violated Article X, section 6 and that Rule 1 was 
needed to cure that defect.230 The court found that the program aided 
sectarian schools when it enacted the program because it permitted the 
indirect payment of tuition at private, religiously-affiliated schools.231 The 
court noted that when a parent donated under the program, they received a 
dollar-for-dollar tax credit, so if their child also received a tuition scholarship 
from the organization they donated to, the amount owed in tuition to that 
school would decrease.232 Thus, the legislature would indirectly pay up to 
$150 of a student’s tuition at a private religious school by allowing the 
student’s parents to receive a tax credit instead of paying that amount in 
tuition.233 
 The court then addressed Rule 1, which the Montana 
Department of Revenue enacted to correct the constitutional defect in the 
tax credit program.234 The court noted that an administrative agency may not 
“transform an unconstitutional statute into a constitutional statute with an 
administrative rule.”235 The court explained that it is the legislature’s 
responsibility to enact statutes that comply with Montana’s Constitution.236 
The court concluded that the tax credit program was unconstitutional and 
that the Montana Department of Revenue exceeded the scope of its 
authority by enacting Rule 1.237  
C. United States Supreme Court’s Decision 
 In a monumental Free Exercise and Establishment Clause case, 
though without any religious monument, the Supreme Court held that the 
Montana scholarship program unlawfully discriminated against religious 
schools by excluding them from a tax benefit.238 The majority’s decision 
marks a new and dangerous chapter for separation between church and 
                                                           
228 Id. at 611. 
229 Id. at 611–14. 
230 Id. at 611. 
231 Id. at 612. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 614–15. 
235 Id. at 615. 
236 Id.  
237 Id. 
238 Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2251 (2020). 
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state. In Espinoza, the majority narrowed the “play in the joints” to a single 
point.239 Though, like in Locke, if any room were to exist between the 
Religion Clauses, it should have been here.240 This section begins by 
discussing the majority opinion. Then, this section addresses the 
concurrences and the dissents of this case.  
1. Chief Justice Roberts and the Majority 
 The majority, penned by Chief Justice Roberts, began by 
addressing the general framework for the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment.241 The majority noted that it has historically recognized a “play 
in the joints” between the two Religion Clauses, referencing Trinity 
Lutheran and Locke.242 However, in continuing its analysis, the majority 
pivoted away from the “play in the joints” completely and placed the 
argument solely within the Free Exercise Clause.243 The Court framed the 
issue as “whether the Free Exercise Clause precluded the Montana 
Supreme Court from applying Montana’s no-aid provision to bar religious 
schools from the scholarship program.”244  
 In determining which level of scrutiny must apply, the majority 
broadened the free exercise right, misinterpreting its narrow decision in 
Trinity Lutheran. The majority explained that “disqualifying otherwise 
eligible recipients from a public benefit ‘solely because of their religious 
character’ imposes ‘a penalty on the free exercise of religion.’”245 However, 
this grossly simplifies the Court’s past decisions. The Court then added that 
where a church is discriminated against simply because of what it is, there is 
a violation of the free exercise right.246 Past cases involving the “play in the 
                                                           
239 Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 435 P.3d 603, 608 (Mont. 2018) (quoting Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). 
240 See id. at 2292 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004)). 
241 Id. at 2254. 
242 Id. (citing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 
(2017)). 
243 Id.  
244 Id.  
245 Id. at 2255 (quoting Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 
2021 (2017)). Here, Chief Justice Roberts’ statement relies heavily on Trinity Lutheran, a 
decision he also penned. Notably, the majority decision in Trinity Lutheran was limited by 
a footnote: “[t]his case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with respect 
to playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of 
discrimination.” Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 
n.3 (2017). Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts ignored this footnote with the intention of 
broadening the case’s holding in the future, or perhaps he simply forgot. 
246 See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2251 (quoting Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2016) (“Because 
of that policy, an otherwise eligible church-owned preschool was denied a grant to resurface 
its playground. Missouri’s policy discriminated against the Church ‘simply because of what it 
is—a church.’”). 
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joints” focused on the use of funds in finding infringement.247 The Court 
previously asked whether the funds were used for actual religious 
instruction, like the salaries of teachers, or “neutral” things like playground 
equipment.248 The Court in Espinoza ignored those qualifications.249 Here, 
the majority held that where a state subsidizes some private education, it 
must fund all private education.250 Under this new precedent, it is now, 
arguably, an infringement of the Free Exercise Clause to offer any public 
benefit with religious use limitations. 
Next, the majority addressed the Montana Department of 
Revenue’s argument that Locke v. Davey governed the case.251 The majority 
distinguished Espinoza from Locke in two ways. First, the Court noted that 
in Locke the state of Washington chose not to fund a distinct category of 
instruction.252 Washington’s scholarship program allowed funds to be used 
at religious schools, just not for certain types of religious study.253 The Court 
explained that Montana’s no-aid provision did not specify or exclude a type 
of religious course or instruction, but rather barred aid to all religious 
schools.254 Again, this departs from past precedent. In Nyquist, the Court 
struck down a tax credit that flowed to parents because it furthered sectarian 
education.255 Here, the majority separated religious education from a 
religious school. Second, the Court pointed to a “historical and substantial” 
state interest in not funding training of clergy.256 The Court explained that 
“no comparable ‘historic and substantial’ tradition supports Montana’s 
decision to disqualify religious schools from government aid.”257 The Court 
focused only on the early 1800s tradition of funding religious and 
nonreligious schools, ignoring the general tradition against state support for 
religious schools in the late 1800s.258 It appears that rather than turning a 
blind eye to history, the Court simply looked back with a wink, opting only 
to see the portion of America’s history that supported the majority 
opinion.259 
                                                           
247 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022; Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004). 
248 See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2016; Locke, 540 U.S. at 724; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971) (holding that two statutory programs providing financial support 
by way of reimbursement of salaries were unconstitutional). 
249 Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2255.  
250 See id. at 2261. 
251 See id. at 2257. 
252 Id. (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 715). 
253 Id. 
254 Id.  
255 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 790 (1973). 
256 Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257. 
257 Id. at 2258.  
258 Id. 
259 See generally id. at 2259. 
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 Then, the majority applied strict scrutiny to Montana’s 
scholarship program. The Montana Department of Revenue contended 
that the no-aid provision promoted religious freedom, protected the 
religious liberty of taxpayers, and kept government out of religious 
operations.260 The Supreme Court noted that advancements in religious 
liberty are not enough to justify the infringement of First Amendment 
Rights.261 The majority also noted that the infringement affected religious 
schools and adherents, burdening the religious schools and the families 
wishing to send their children to those schools.262 The Court stated that 
Montana’s no-aid provision cut families off from otherwise available 
benefits if they chose a religious private school.263 In applying strict scrutiny, 
the Court only scrutinized the arguments made by the Montana Department 
of Revenue and not the scholarship program itself.264 As previously 
explained, the program gave taxpayers tax credit for either providing 
supplemental funding to public schools or donating to the program.265 A 
taxpayer would receive a dollar-for-dollar tax credit up to $150 for donating 
to a student scholarship organization in Montana that met three additional 
criteria.266  
The majority oversimplified and overcomplicated the situation. 
While parents may not receive a dollar-for-dollar tax credit up to $150 for 
their donation, a parent may still choose to send their child to a religious 
school.267 In addition, by donating to a scholarship program, there is no 
guarantee that their child would benefit from the donation.268 It seems, 
though, that the majority is treating the tax credit for a donation to a 
scholarship program as if it were a tax credit for tuition. This ignores the 
critical third party: the student scholarship organization, and wrongfully 
presumes that any person that donates has a child that may receive a 
scholarship because their parent donated. 
 The majority concluded with a Supremacy Clause argument, 
holding that the Montana Supreme Court violated the Supremacy Clause 
by striking down a program that did not align with the State Constitution 
when the constitutional provision was in direct conflict with the Free 
Exercise Clause.269 The Court explained that the Montana Supreme Court 
should have started its analysis with the Free Exercise Clause, as federal law 
                                                           
260 See id. at 2260. 
261 See id. 
262 See id. at 2261. 
263 See id. 
264 See id. at 2260. 
265 Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 435 P.3d 603, 606 (Mont. 2018). 
266 See id.  
267 See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261. 
268 See Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 612–13. 
269 Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2262. 
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is supreme.270 Thus, because Montana’s program violated the Free Exercise 
Clause, the Montana Supreme Court should have stopped its analysis of the 
program.271 The Court ended by explaining that the Montana Supreme 
Court’s elimination of the program “flowed directly from [its] failure to 
follow the dictates of federal law,” and “[could not] be defended.”272 
2. Concurrences: (1) Justice Thomas joined by Justice Gorsuch; (2) 
Justice Alito; and (3) Justice Gorsuch 
 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred in the 
majority opinion but seized the opportunity to argue for an 
accommodationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause.273 Justice 
Thomas explained that the Establishment Clause should only protect 
against the imposition of an established religion by the federal 
government.274 He continues to urge the Court away from the Lemon test.275 
 Alternatively, Justice Alito’s concurrence focused on the no-aid 
provision itself.276 The majority, without ruling on the validity of no-aid 
clauses in general, spent a great deal of its time analyzing Montana’s no-aid 
provision.277 Justice Alito’s concurrence focused on Blaine Amendments, 
their nativist viewpoint, and anti-Catholic or anti-Jewish sentiments.278 The 
Blaine Amendment was a proposed amendment to the United States 
Constitution, introduced by House Speaker James Blaine.279 Though the 
amendment was not passed at the federal level, several states adopted their 
own “Blaine Amendments.”280 These state constitutional provisions, similar 
to Montana’s constitutional provision, bar the use of public funds to aid 
                                                           
270 See id. 
271 See id. 
272 Id. 
273 See id. at 2266 (Thomas, J., concurring). Accommodationists assert that the Establishment 
Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating religion’s 
central role in our society. VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10259, SUPREME 
COURT MAY RECONSIDER ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE IN CHALLENGE TO 




275 See id. at 2267. 
276 See id. at 2268–74 (Alito, J., concurring). 
277 Id. at 2246 (majority opinion).  
278 See id. at 2269–70 (Alito, J., concurring).  
279 See id.  
280 Erica Smith, Blaine Amendments and the Unconstitutionality of Excluding Religious 
Options From School Choice Programs, 18 FED. SOC. R. 88, 90 (2017). 
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sectarian institutions.281 Justice Alito, likely, would have preferred a majority 
opinion striking down all Blaine Amendments.282 
 Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence focused on the distinction between 
religious status and religious use.283 Justice Gorsuch noted that he questioned 
the characterization of discrimination in Trinity Lutheran and in 
Espinoza.284 He explained that the record in Espinoza discussed religious 
activity, uses, and conduct in depth.285 He next framed the issue as two 
questions.286 The first based on status, asks whether Montana sought to 
prevent religious parents and schools from participating.287 The second, 
based on use, asks whether Montana aimed to bar public benefits from 
being used to support religious education.288 However, Justice Gorsuch 
arrived at the same conclusion as the majority.289 Justice Gorsuch ultimately 
concluded that “[c]alling it discrimination on the basis of religious status or 
religious activity makes no difference: [i]t is unconstitutional all the same.”290 
3. Dissents: (1) Justice Ginsburg joined by Justice Kagan; (2) Justice 
Breyer joined in part by Justice Kagan; and (3) Justice Sotomayor 
 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by Justice Kagan, argued that 
because the Montana Supreme Court’s decision did not discriminate, 
Petitioners’ Free Exercise claim fails.291 Justice Ginsburg found the decision 
neutral because the Montana Supreme Court struck down the program in 
its entirety, so both secular and sectarian schools were ineligible for 
benefits.292 She explained that the “Court has consistently refused to treat 
neutral government action as unconstitutional solely because it fails to 
benefit religious exercise.”293  
 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan in part, discussed the “play 
in the joints.”294 Justice Breyer wrote that he feared the majority’s approach 
because the conclusion risked the “entanglement and conflict that the 
                                                           
281 See id. 
282 Id. at 2274 (“And even if Montana had done more to address its no-aid provision’s past, 
that would of course do nothing to resolve the bias inherent in the Blaine Amendments 
among the 17 states.”). 
283 See id. at 2275–78 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
284 See id. at 2275. 
285 See id.  
286 See id.  
287 See id. 
288 See id. 
289 See id. at 2278. 
290 Id. 
291 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
292 See id. at 2279. 
293 See id. 
294 Id. at 2281 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Religion Clauses are intended to prevent.”295 Justice Breyer framed the 
question in Espinoza, not as whether the Establishment Clause forbids 
Montana from subsidizing religious education, but rather whether the Free 
Exercise Clause requires Montana to do so.296 Placing the argument squarely 
within the “play in the joints,” Justice Breyer would have Locke control the 
decision in Espinoza.297 Justice Breyer noted that “[i]f, for 250 years, [the 
Court has] drawn a line at forcing taxpayers to pay the salaries of those who 
teach their faith from the pulpit, I do not see how we can today require 
Montana to adopt a different view respecting those who teach it in the 
classroom.”298 
 Finally, Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion explained that the 
majority decision slighted precedent and weakened the separation of church 
and state.299 Justice Sotomayor, similar to Justice Ginsburg, noted that the 
Free Exercise Clause claim was not cognizable because there was no 
differential treatment or coercion.300 She then addressed the majority’s 
Supremacy Clause argument, explaining that the majority departed from 
precedent in implying a federal question not raised by the parties.301 Justice 
Sotomayor concluded by addressing the majority’s reasoning, noting that its 
decision “risks reading the Establishment Clause out of the Constitution.”302  
IV. FUNDAMENTAL FUNDS 
 The Supreme Court’s past Establishment Clause and Free 
Exercise Clause decisions did not pave a clear pathway—or a path at all. This 
section begins by comparing Espinoza to the cases discussed above. Next, 
this section advances the argument that Espinoza should not have been 
decided under Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause precedent, 
but elsewhere, because funds are simply not fundamental. 
A. Where Espinoza Fits  
 Montana’s Supreme Court took a unique approach to addressing 
the constitutionality of the program, analyzing it exclusively under the State’s 
Constitution. Though the Supreme Court could have decided Espinoza 
within the narrow confines of past precedent related to scholarship 
                                                           
295 Id. 
296 Id. at 2283. 
297 Id. at 2284. 
298 Id. at 2288. 
299 See id. at 2292 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
300 See id. at 2293.  
301 See id. 2294 (“The Court typically declines to read state-court decisions as impliedly 
resolving federal questions, especially ones not raised by the parties.”). 
302 See id. at 2296. 
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programs and religious schools, Trinity Lutheran’s footnote was instructive: 
precedent implicating government funds and religious entities is extremely 
limited in scope.303 Given the differences between the tax credit program at 
issue in Espinoza, and the related schemes in other Religion Clause cases, 
it is evident that the Court should not try to make the facts fit.  
 The Supreme Court upheld Ohio’s scholarship program,304 but 
struck down New York’s.305 The Court distinguished Ohio’s program from 
the program in New York for two reasons: (1) the New York program only 
provided benefits to private schools; and (2) the Court in the New York 
case, Nyquist, reserved judgment with respect to public assistance made 
available to both public and private schools.306 However, even in deciding 
the Ohio program case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court limited the 
reach of the decision by finding the program “neutral with respect to 
religion” because it “provide[d] benefits directly to a wide spectrum of 
individuals, defined only by financial need and residence” and “permit[ted] 
such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and 
private, secular and religious.”307 The Court declared the program one of 
“true private choice.”308 Where Espinoza differs is that the funds at issue 
were not tuition credits or reimbursement, and there was no “true private 
choice.”  
 Again, in Trinity Lutheran, the Supreme Court drew a narrow 
distinction between the facts at hand and past precedent. The key 
differentiator was that Trinity Lutheran required the organization to choose 
whether to be a church or religiously affiliated, whereas Locke required 
Davey to choose, not whether to be religious, but what to study.309 However, 
framed differently, the choice in Trinity Lutheran could be simpler than 
that. The choice is whether to have a rubber playground or not; or whether 
to apply for governmental funding or not. Regardless, the key seems to be 
the type of choice the individual or organization must make. Though, there 
may be an argument about the difference in use of the funds—the type of 
choice is sufficient enough to distinguish Espinoza. 
 In Espinoza, the issue is much further removed from the religious 
choices at issue in Trinity and Locke. The parents in Espinoza are not 
                                                           
303 See supra note 245. 
304 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002).  
305 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973). 
306 536 U.S. at 661 (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782–83 n.38). 
307 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662.  
308 Id. 
309 Compare Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023–
24 (2017), with Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724–25 (2004) (in Locke an individual could 
not receive funding while pursuing a devotional theology degree, but the individual could be 
religious and receive funding, in Trinity Lutheran to receive funding an organization could 
not be religious or religiously affiliated). 
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choosing between sending their children to religious schools or not and they 
are not choosing between being religious or not. The parents in Espinoza 
choose to donate or not. There is no guarantee that, if they donate, their 
children will receive scholarships to attend a private religious institution. In 
fact, the tax credit program prohibited donors from directing their 
contributions to a specific parent, guardian, or even school.310 
 There is no need to fit Espinoza within the margins of the “play 
in the joints” precedent. Instead, Espinoza should be decided within 
precedent established by cases involving access to funding as there is no 
fundamental right infringed.  
B. Fundamental Rights Analysis: No Infringement  
 While the Supreme Court does not recognize the right to public 
education as a fundamental right,311 the plaintiffs in Espinoza asked the court 
to recognize an analogous right—a fundamental right to funding private 
religious education.312 Framed as a violation of the petitioners’ free exercise 
rights, the alleged infringement was a denial of public funding to pay for 
private religious education.313 This lack of access to public funds is not an 
infringement of the free exercise right. Thus, Montana’s No-Aid Clause 
must be subject only to rational basis review.  
 Under the Free Exercise Clause there is a fundamental right to be 
free from unequal treatment due to religious status.314 Therefore, in 
legislating between the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause, a 
state may not support any specific church or exclude any individuals due to 
their religious beliefs or lack thereof.315 Following the Madisonian view, this 
understanding of the fundamental free exercise right diffuses and 
                                                           
310 Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 435 P.3d 603, 606 (Mont. 2018).  
311 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of course, 
is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do 
we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”). 
312 See Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 7, at 23–24 (explaining the history and tradition 
of similar no-aid clauses and asking the court to end the national tradition of religious 
discrimination). 
313 See MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019) (“The legislature, 
counties, cities, towns, school districts, and public corporations shall not make any direct or 
indirect appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies, or any grant of lands or 
other property for any sectarian purpose or to aid any church, school, academy, seminary, 
college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by 
any church, sect, or denomination.”). 
314 See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017); 
Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).  
315 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. 
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decentralizes power to prevent dominance by any particular sect or 
religion.316  
 Since there is freedom to exercise religion without interference 
from the state, it follows that the right to free exercise includes the option of 
parents to choose to send their children to private religious schools. In 
choosing a private religious school, a parent exercises their religious 
freedom. Again, there is an important line to be drawn with regard to free 
exercise. The fundamental right of free exercise is absolute with regard to 
beliefs.317  
However, the right to religiously motivated conduct is not 
absolute.318 For example, the Supreme Court upheld a law forbidding 
polygamy in Reynolds v. United States stating that Congress could “reach 
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good 
order.”319 In Goldman v. Weinberger, the Court denied the claim of a Jewish 
Air Force doctor who said his religion required him to wear a yarmulke in 
violation of the military dress code.320 Like Reynolds, only the conduct in 
Goldman was being regulated.321 In both instances, the parties were still free 
to exercise their own beliefs.322 
 At stake in cases regarding No-Aid Clauses and raising issues 
related to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, are schemes 
providing benefits to taxpayers.323 These schemes, like Reynolds and 
Goldman, concern regulation of religiously motivated conduct, not the 
exercise of beliefs.324 The petitioners’ contention that the No-Aid Clause 
violates their right to free exercise rests on the assertion that, without these 
funds, the petitioners would not be able to choose to send their children to 
private religious schools.325 In Espinoza, the program struck down under 
Montana’s No-Aid Clause was, in essence, a tuition credit. Individuals 
received tax credits for donating to nonprofit student scholarship 
organizations.326 Then, these organizations used the donations to fund 
                                                           
316 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 1723. 
317 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961). 
318 Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04, 306 (1940)).  
319 Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). The Court noted that polygamy had consistently 
been treated as an offense against society throughout history. 
320 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (acknowledging a need to defer to the 
military). 
321 See id. at 510. 
322 See id.; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. 
323 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002) (explaining the types of 
assistance provided to parents); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
413 U.S. 756, 762 (1973) (describing the financial aid programs for nonpublic elementary 
and secondary schools which included tuition reimbursement and grants).  
324 See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 503; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. 
325 Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 7, at 7. 
326 Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at 3. 
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scholarships for qualified education providers.327 Despite various degrees of 
separation, the program operated to lessen tuition expenses for parents 
choosing to send their children to private religious institutions. In fact, the 
petitioners relied on the tax credit to create financial aid to allow them to 
send their children to these religious private schools.328 Without the 
program, the parents in Espinoza could experience financial hardship in 
sending their children to religious private schools.  
 However, the Court has established that fundamental rights do 
not include the right to receive government funding in the exercise of that 
right.329 As Justice Powell explained in Maher v. Roe, a fundamental right 
“implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment 
. . . and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.”330 
Justice Stewart echoed Justice Powell’s reasoning four years later in Harris 
v. McRae, stating that the fundamental right of abortion “does not confer an 
entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages 
of that freedom.”331 In both instances, the Court found that while the ability 
to finance abortions may have become more difficult given the specific 
legislation, the legislation did not infringe the fundamental right to 
abortion.332 
 Similarly, while the Court recognizes a fundamental right to 
marry,333 it has upheld the constitutionality of laws that may, in effect, 
discourage marriage.334 In Califano v. Jobst, the Court upheld a provision of 
the Social Security Act that terminated benefits for disabled children 
(classified as wage earners’ dependent) when those children got married.335 
                                                           
327 Id. 
328 Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 7, at 7. 
329 See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980) (“Although the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government 
interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not 
confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that 
freedom.”); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1977) (“Roe did not declare an unqualified 
‘constitutional right to an abortion’ . . . . Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly 
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.”); 
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977) (holding that the Medicaid Act did not require states 
to fund nontherapeutic first-trimester abortions as participants in the joint federal and state 
program); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (holding that the City of St. Louis did 
not violate any constitutional rights in electing to provide public financing for childbirth 
hospital services but not for nontherapeutic abortions).  
330 Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74. 
331 Harris, 448 U.S. at 318. 
332 See id. at 318; Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74. 
333 Loving v. Virginia, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1967).  
334 See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 350 (1986); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 58 (1977). 
335 See Califano, 434 U.S. at 58. 
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The Court acknowledged that the exception could have an impact on a 
desire to marry, but ultimately held that the provision was constitutional.336  
 In Bowen v. Owens, the Court again recognized the fundamental 
right to marry, but allowed the denial of funds.337 In Owens, widows of wage 
earners sued regarding a different provision of the Social Security Act: a 
provision denying payment of widow’s benefits to a divorced widow who 
remarried.338 Both cases involved the right to marry—a fundamental right—
but neither provision infringed on that right. Instead, the provisions 
financially disincentivized the right, but that is neither a de facto nor de jure 
ban on the right to marriage. 
 Thus, it follows that in a case involving a No-Aid Clause, the right 
to free exercise of religion does not include a right to public funds to realize 
all the advantages of that freedom. Parents, like the parents in Espinoza, are 
able to send their children to whichever school they choose. They may 
exercise their religion in opting to send their children to private religious 
schools, or they may send their children to public schools. What the No-
Aid Clause prevents is funding of that decision. The choice of states like 
Montana to enact No-Aid Clauses and prohibit funds for religious education 
is not a free exercise infringement. It is a “play in the joints” between the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses because funds themselves are not 
fundamental.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 In recognizing the petitioner’s fundamental right to funds for their 
private religious institutions, the majority has allowed the walls of the 
Establishment Clause to crumble. To require a government to fund private 
religious education any time it funds education does not fit within any of the 
Framers’ understandings of the relationship between government and 
religion.339 In fact, under the majority’s decision in Espinoza, upholding the 
Establishment Clause violates the Free Exercise Clause, except in the (rare) 
occasion of a federal government-sponsored religion. 
 The Court erred in its decision, departing entirely from precedent, 
and improperly broadening the Free Exercise Right. Instead, the Montana 
Supreme Court’s decision should have been upheld, and the tax credit 
program should have been analyzed using rational basis review because 
                                                           
336 Id.  
337 See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 340. 
338 See id. at 343–44. 
339 See CHEMERINKSY, supra note 17, at 1723. Both Evangelists and Jeffersonians would be 
bothered by the excessive level of entanglement, with the government involved in religion 
and religion involved in government if funding is fundamental. Arguably, this may be a 
diffusion of power by requiring the funds to be given to religious institutions, but it is 
impossible to imagine a situation where the government allows funds to flow without 
attaching strings of some sort.  
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there was no infringement of the taxpayer’s fundamental rights. Montana’s 
No-Aid Clause and Rule 1 under the tax credit program did not infringe the 
parent’s rights to free exercise. By excluding private religious institutions, 
Montana properly acted within the “play in the joints” between the Free 
Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause because funds themselves are 
not fundamental. 
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